We propose a preimage attack against cryptographic hash functions based on the speedup enabled by quantum computing. Preimage resistance is a fundamental property cryptographic hash functions must possess. The motivation behind this work relies in the lack of conventional attacks against newly introduced hash schemes such as the recently elected SHA-3 standard.
Introduction
In October 2012, a new hash algorithm was elected by N IST as the SHA-3 standard. Keccak, the winner of this selection process, is based on a "sponge" construction and is claimed to be able to provide a high level of security: the probability of success for any attack being asymptotic to that of a random oracle [7] . Since the growth of modern computer systems, the cryptographic hash functions became a constant need in activities involving authentication or pseudo-random number generation. The call for a single, omni-reliable and accepted algorithm that guarantees the modern security needs was therefore natural.
In this article, we investigate hash functions through the usage of quantum computers. Besides being elected as SHA-3, we use Keccak as a point of reference, for the fact that no reliable theoretical or practical pre-image or collision attacks have been proposed against the complete version of the algorithm. We give a brief overview of Keccak in Appendix A. * razvan.rosie10@imperial.ac.uk
In section 2, we describe how to link the preimage attack with quantum computing, proposing an algorithm based on the Deutsch-Jozsa circuit. Finally, in section 3 we explain how a quantum preimage attack can be used against a hash function.
Motivation
Hash functions are deterministic cryptographic primitives, mapping arbitrarily long input bit-strings to fixsized bit-strings, called message digests or hash values. Essential properties that hash functions should exhibit are non-invertibility and close to uniform distribution of output values. There are three intrinsic properties that capture the nature of hash functions which we describe below:
1. P reimage resistance: Given a hash function h and a message digest y, it should be computationally infeasible to find a message m such that h(m) = y.
2. Second preimage resistance: Given a hash function h and an input message m 1 , it should be computationally infeasible to find a different m 2 such that h(m 1 ) = h(m 2 ).
3. Collision resistance: It should be computationally infeasible to find two different messages m 1 and m 2 such that h(m 1 ) = h(m 2 ).
Asking if a hash scheme fulfills these requirements is, without doubts, a fascinating question. We are now able to state that our problem can be defined as a preimage resistance one. Given a message digest y and a hash function h fulfilling the above properties, finding an input x such that h(x) = y, may be done either by searching the input space or by exploiting the construction details of h. Related research [9] is directed to the collision finding problem, where the Birthday paradox gives an intuition of its complexity. If D represents the output set produced by h, on average, we should inspect at least |D| outputs before expecting the first collision. What we propose here, is to investigate a broad search space through the means offered by quantum computing, while tackling the problem of finding preimages.
Towards quantum preimage attacks
We start by formalizing the problem to solve: given a discrete search space S of size |S| consisting of the first 1 arXiv:1412.3164v1 [cs.CR] 10 Dec 2014
2.1 The Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm |S| consecutive non-negative integers and a (target) bitstring t of fixed length N , being generated by a known hash function h :
, we intend to find x ∈ S such that h(x) = t. For simplicity, we assume the size of S is a power of 2 and |S|≥ 2. We introduce the following useful function: Definition 1. For a given pair consisting of a target value t ∈ Z N 2 and a hash function h : Z ∞ 2 → Z N 2 , we define the target function T t : S → Z 2 as follows:
Using these notations, we give an overview of our method for finding preimage attacks: we start with a general input set S that is representable on log 2 |S| classical bits. S can be divided in two disjoint and equally sized subsets S 0 and S 1 by enforcing the first of log 2 |S| available bits to be 0 or 1, an action that is similar to a binary cut. A quantum circuit is used to determine if the target function T t vanishes on any of these two subsets. If it does, we select (one of) the subset(s) containing a root of the target function. We repeat the routine for the most recently discovered subset until we reach a subset of size 1. Hence, it can be easily observed the target function acts as the decision variable in a binary search problem (Figure 1 ). The preimage value of x can be obtained by concatenating the indexes of the subsets we chose in each step. There are two major obstacles in front of this approach that we need to address:
1. Implementing a hash function h as a quantum circuit (notice that T t is derived from h).
2. Deciding if a subset contains a preimage value, or equivalently, if the target function vanishes on a given input set.
The second one is detailed in section 2.3.3, and makes use of the idea introduced in [2] and known as the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm.
As regards the possibility of implementing hash functions as quantum circuits, the following fundamental result ensures it is theoretically possible: "the universal quantum computer Q can perfectly simulate any Turing machine and can simulate with arbitrary precision any quantum computer or simulator" [1] .
Such a categoric statement may appear counterintuitive, given the reversible nature (excepting the measurement) of the quantum mechanics, the "engine" behind a quantum computer. Schrödinger's equation: requires a relatively small number of gates, and this is a promising result in the quantum world (a small number of quantum gates can make such a circuit realizable).
The Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm
The Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm is a fundamental construct in our proposal. In short, the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm solves the following problem: given a boolean function f , seen as an oracle, that is either balanced or constant, we can find the nature of f in constant time. The time improvement is exponential, compared with the classical deterministic solution. This is done by exploiting the property of superposition of quantum bits (qubits). The algorithm we refer to as Deutsch-Jozsa, is the result of several successive improvements of the initial version proposed by David Deutsch. We assume a minimal familiarity with the basic concepts of quantum computer science (interested readers may want to consult [3] for a brief introduction) and make use of the standard notations, where ⊗ stands for the tensor Kronecker product over Hilbert spaces and ⊕ for addition over Z n . Several building concepts that serve in our description of next sections are defined below.
inputs map to 0 and 2 n−1 inputs map to 1.
Deutsch's algorithm restricts its view to the trivial case of a balanced function where n = 1, and is a special case of the more general Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm. We focus on the more general problem, with the intention to use a derived version of it while inspecting hash functions.
Definition 3. A "binary" inner product
The binary inner product [x,y] is defined as a function from
The usefulness of the binary inner product is seen when introducing an n-dimensional Hadamard operator. The basic 1-qubit Hadamard gate is represented by H = 1 √ 2
( 1 1 1 −1 ). Apart from its simplicity, this operator is required to put the qubit in superposition:
The general Hadamard gate can be obtained from the tensor product of several unidimensional Hadamard gates. It can be shown that it has the following form:
Definition 4. The n-dimensional Hadamard operator:
, where [i,j] stands for the binary inner product.
Overview of Deutsch-Jozsa circuit
Below, we present the content of the state after each phase of the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm. The first state of the algorithm, |φ 0 consists of the initial n+1 input qubits that are required by the algorithm. As seen in Figure 2 , the leading n qubits are represented by the tensor product of n |0 qubits. The tensor product is the "binding" operator. We write |0 n = |0 ⊗ .. ⊗ |0 n , using Dirac's notation.
The result of applying the Hadamard operators on the two groups of qubits, is revealed in |φ 1 -the qubits are in superposition.
The central part of the algorithm makes use of quantum parallelism enabled by qubits' superposition, to evaluate the function f , represented as the oracle U f . |φ 2 stands for the output of U f (Figure 3 ). Converting x∈{0,1} n |x into x∈{0,1} n (−1) f (x) through the means of U f , can be justified by the output produced by U f given that |x (|f (x) −|1⊕f (x) ) = (−1)
f (x) |x (|0 −|1 ). The last part applies an n-qubit Hadamard gate to the leading n qubits, and is used to make possible bringing the qubits in one of the classical states, |0 or |1 , therefore allowing quantum devices to measure them as ordinary bits. The last qubit is no longer used and can be ignored when writing the last state.
Finally, when the last (and measurable) state of the circuit is inspected, it can be seen that a |0 n is measured with the following probability:
If the function f is constant, the measurement of the last state will produce +1|0 n , or −1|0 n , depending on f being constant to 0 or 1. Similarly, if f is balanced, when measuring |φ 3 , the result will collapse to 0|0 n . To conclude, the Deutsch-Jozsa circuit allows for a clear and deterministic distinction between balanced and constant functions.
Deutsch-Jozsa applied in preimage existence checking
As stated previously, we intend to apply a modified version of the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm on a search space S using an oracle obtained from a cryptographic hash function h and a message digest t generated by h, with the declared purpose to identify if the searched space S contains a preimage x of the target t.
From hash to target functions
The first technical problem concerns the construction of the Deutsch-Jozsa circuit, that handles multiple boolean inputs to single boolean output functions. To enable preimage existence checks, we make use of the target function T (definition 1), rather than h itself. Notice that T was constructed to serve our purpose, vanishing for a preimage value x. Computing the function T t given (h, t) can be easily done by applying OR gates in a Wimbledon-knockout tournament style to the bits resulting from the XOR between t and the output of h, as depicted in Figure 4 . Notice the roots of T t are preimages for h(t).
Adapting Deutsch-Jozsa circuit to check for existence of preimages
The second problem that needs to be solved regards the applicability of the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm given the design of modern hash functions. In short, given a decent hash function, we expect a close to zero ratio between the number of roots x of the target function T t and the cardinality of input space S. Based on this observation, we re-examine the states of the Deutsch-Jozsa, particularly |φ 2 and |φ 3 (we are only interested in the states after the application of U Tt ). Consider |φ 2 :
Given the fact that T t may or may not have roots on S, after the unitary transform U Tt is applied, the state |φ 2 can end up in one of the following situations (we use the explicit ket vector representation of the first n qubits):
An expected small number of x for which T t (x) = 0 implies that | 1 2 n x∈{0,1} n (−1) f (x) | 2 is close to 1 for n large. When the last Hadamard transform is applied (|φ 3 is obtained) and the measurement is performed, the probability to detect if T t has roots on the input space is close to 0. To overcome this obstacle, a feasible way to check for existence of preimages in S is needed. In quantum world, this translates in finding an algorithm able to distinguish between the two possible forms of |φ 2 presented above. One approach that might be immediately spotted: this problem may be transformed into a searching one and solved by Grover's circuit in 2 n/2
iterations. An alternative solution is proposed below.
Decision by failure
We continue the theoretical journey with the most important part, that introduces a simple way to distinguish between two state |ψ = −1 √ 2 n x∈{0,1} n |x and |φ = 1 √ 2 n x∈{0,1} n (−1) f (x) |x where one (more) entries in the second state are positive (only for this problem we assume the entries in the kets representing |ψ , |φ belong to R). We refer to these two states as being two states equivalent up to a relative phase. Consider the following non-unitary but still Hermitian operator:
where I 2 n stands for the identity matrix, A 2 n is the average matrix with a i,j = 1 2 n and p ∈ R. Proposition 1. The non-unitary, self-adjoint operator O preserves the entries of a normalized and constant state represented by |ψ = −1 √ 2 n x∈{0,1} n |x . Proof: Let |ψ = −1 √ 2 n x∈{0,1} n |x . Hence: |Oψ = (pA 2 n − (p − 1)I 2 n )|ψ ⇔ |Oψ = pA 2 n |ψ − (p − 1)I 2 n |ψ ⇔ |Oψ = p|ψ − (p − 1)|ψ = |ψ Due to the fact that O is non-unitary, it cannot be used as part of the circuit, but only as a measurement operator. The need for unitary operators in quantum circuits is a consequence of the postulates of quantum mechanics, that enforce the norm-preservation of quantum states throughout the system. We show how to use the newly introduced operator as a measurement one.
Consider the average result of measuring that a quantum system is in state |ψ = 
In the general case, the action of a dispersion operator such as O will be in amplifying the absolute difference between positive and negative entries, while preserving kets with constant entries unchanged. Hence, for a non-constant ket, the mean of observed values will be different by 1 and dependent on parameter p. Several measurements need to be performed to ensure that enough data is available for calculating the mean.
If the operator O can be physically implemented for p close to 2 n (as suggested in Appendix B) , then there is a way of deciding if the input space S contains or not at least a root of the target function T t (i.e preimage of h):
• O = 1, if ∃x ∈ S s.t. T t (x) = 0. 
Quantum preimage attacks
In this section, we formalize a quantum preimage attack algorihm. We start by assuming the existence of a hash function h, producing fixed sized outputs of binary length N . We can handle hash algorithms that produce classes of outputs by defining a family of hash functions for each configuration of the algorithm. In the case of Keccak, we can define h 224 , h 256 , h 384 and h 512 , for the available configurations of the algorithm described in Appendix A. For an accurate description of the method, we assume the existence of a subset S of the infinite input space, such that S = {0, 1, .., 2 n − 1} (in general n = N ), and a target function T as the one defined in definition 1. The outcome of this section is an algorithm able to identify a preimage value x (given that such a value exists) of the input space of h, fulfilling the constraint: h(x) = t or equivalently T t (x) = 0.
An algorithm for computing preimages of hash functions (high level overview)
• Given:
2 -a hash function producing message digests of binary size N -an input set S = {0, 1, 2, .., 2 n − 1}, n > 1 -a positive target integer t -a quantum computer with n + 1 available qubits allowed to query an oracle implementing T t -a result array r.
•
Step 1: Select one x ∈ S. If T t (x) is 0, output x and halt. Otherwise, run the adapted DeutschJozsa algorithm with O = pA 2 n − (p − 1)I 2 n and p = 2 n . If the expectation is (close to) 1, report that no preimage x exists in S. Halt.
• Step 2: If |S|> 1, go to Step 3. Otherwise, go to
Step 6.
Step 3: Split S in two equally sized sets S 0 and S 1 . Select x 0 ∈ S 0 and x 1 ∈ S 1 . If T t (x 0 ) or T t (x 1 ) are 0, print (x 0 , x 1 ) and halt. Otherwise, go to Step 4.
• Step 4: Run the quantum adapted Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm on S 0 . If S 0 contains a preimage, the expectation will be different by 1, add 0 to the result array r, update S = S 0 and go to Step 2.
Step 5: Run the quantum adapted Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm on S 1 . If S 1 contains a preimage, the expectation will be different by 1, add 1 to the result array r, update S = S 1 and go to Step 2.
• Step 6: Construct the preimage x by concatenating the bits in the result array r. Halt.
As regards the complexity of the algorithm, it is logarithmic in the size of the input space S. The correctness of the classical algorithm relies on the correctness of the binary search problem. We do not need to check for middle values, (|S| is power of 2). The sanity checks -values from each subset are tested for being preimages -are used to handle the extreme cases when all elements in S are preimages of t (quantum expectation will be 1, same as if S would have no preimage). Good cryptographic hash functions exhibit a close to uniform distribution of bits [4] . Given the Law of large numbers, we expect that the iteration of the quantum part of the algorithm to be repeated for a constant number of times. This is not a great computational obstruction, and its purpose is to approximate the expectation with a good accuracy.
Conclusion
The main contribution of this work resides in proposing an algorithm for finding preimages given a value produced by a known hash function. The need for such a proposal relies in the lack of practical results through the means of classical cryptanalysis techniques against the recently introduced hash functions, such as Keccak. In particular, we make use of the binary search algorithm and extend it in a novel fashion, by linking it with the highly theoretical area of quantum computing.
A slight variation of the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm is used as the core quantum part in our process of finding preimages in the input set.
The approaches described by this work are entirely theoretical and obviously limited by the practical feasibility of the suggested measurement observable. From this point of view, the applicability of our proposal is highly constrained. However, the problem discussed here remains open, and eventuality, a reliable, universally accepted quantum computer, will be used in testing it. A A short description of Keccak
References
In this section, a short description of Keccak is given. For a complete understanding, the official specification of Keccak [6] should be consulted. According to [6] , Keccak is a family of hash functions based on the sponge construction. The sponge can be viewed as a three-dimensional matrix a, also denoted the state (Figure 6 ), which plays a role in "absorbing" the input (XOR-ing it in a part of the state), and then "squeezing" out a part of the processed entries as output. To prepare the hash values, Keccak uses an underlying function Keccak-f [b] acting on the entire state, with parameter b ∈ {25, 50, 100, 200, 400, 800, 1600} denoting the width of the permutation (the number of elements in a). Figure 6 describes how Keccak is arranged as a 5 × 5 array of lanes, with the lanes pointing in direction of z axis. The official submission [6] uses a default value w = 64 as the number of binary entries in a lane, chosen to facilitate the implementation on 64-bit processors. Therefore, the state contains b = 5 × 5 × 64 = 1600 bits.
A string s of 5 × 5 × w bits is mapped into the b bits of the state a as follows:
The b contiguous bits in the state can be split in between the "outer part" (the first r bits ) and the "inner part" or "capacity "c, consisting of last c = b − r bits of the state. c is chosen to be 2N where N is the size of the output generated by the algorithm.
A.1 Padding
The padding of a message M to a sequence of x-bit blocks is denoted by M ||pad[x](|M |). The algorithm makes uses a multi-rate padding scheme, which is implemented by appending a single bit 1 followed by the minimum number of bits 0 and finally by a 1 to ensure the resulting block is a multiple of r. Multi-rate padding appends at least 2 bits and at most the number of bits in a block plus one.
A.2 Absorbing phase
The absorbing phase works iteratively on the state. Each block of r consecutive bits of the padded message is appended to the inner part of the state. After the block is absorbed into the sponge, the Keccak − f routine is called.
A.3 Keccak-f
Keccak-f encapsulates the real hashing algorithm. The number of rounds increases by the size of w by the following rule: 12 + 2 · l, with l = log 2 (w). The submitted 
A.3.1 Theta
θ is the first permutation that is applied on the sponge. It is aimed to diffusion, and without θ, Keccak will not provide any data diffusion at all. In short, the value of each bit in the state matrix is obtained as an XOR between the sums (over GF (2) 
A.3.5 Iota
The main purpose of ι is to disrupt the symmetry of Keccak It consists of the addition of round constants. Without it, the round function would be translationinvariant in the z axis and all rounds would be equal making Keccak − f subject to attacks exploiting symmetry such as slide attacks.
2 2n For a hash function, we assume u = 0 (otherwise the problem is trivial). If we select p = 2 n (notice that p = 2 n will make pA the unit matrix), we get the expectation modeled by:
1, otherwise
In the first case, the expectation is different by 1, and this result allows to distinguish between two states that are equivalent up to a relative phase.
